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1The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 05-2054
__________
YONG WONG PARK,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
__________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review
(BIA No. A27-905-890)
IJ Annie S. Garcy
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 28, 2006
____________
Before: FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge1
(Filed: December 29, 2006)
      
2Before it was amended in 2006, section 2320(a) stated, in part:
Whoever intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and
knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or
services shall, if an individual, be fined not more than $2,000,000 or imprisoned
not more than 10 years, or both . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2000).
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OPINION
____________________
Garth, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question of whether a conviction for trafficking in
counterfeit goods or services in violation of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984,
18 U.S.C. § 2320,2 is a conviction for “an offense relating to . . . counterfeiting,” pursuant
3This section provides that for purposes of Chapter 12 of the INA, the term “aggravated
felony” includes any “offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or
trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which the term
of imprisonment is at least one year.” INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).
4Park admitted to selling clothing which bore the counterfeit trademark of Nike and
Tommy Hilfiger, and that he knew the trademark was counterfeit and so that the goods were not
authentic. App. 62-63.
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to section 101(a)(43)(R) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(R).3 We conclude that it is.
I
Petitioner Yong Wong Park is a native and citizen of the Republic of Korea. He was
admitted to the United States as an immigrant on or about February 12, 1998. On February
18, 2000, Park pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York to one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods or services from at least February
1997 through October 1997, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320.4 On July 5, 2000, he was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 21 months.
After his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal
proceedings. In a Notice to Appear, the DHS charged Park with removability under INA §
237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for having been “convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude committed within five years after admission for which a sentence of one year
or longer may be imposed.” App. 85. At a hearing on April 25, 2002, Park admitted the
factual allegations in the Notice to Appear, but denied the removal charge and filed a motion
to terminate proceedings. The parties presented argument on whether the crime for which
4Park was convicted qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude. On June 25, 2002, the
immigration judge (“IJ”) determined that Park’s conviction was not for a crime involving
moral turpitude, and granted his motion to terminate. The DHS appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). In an Order dated April 21, 2004, the BIA vacated the IJ’s
decision, finding that Park was removable as charged. The BIA remanded for further
proceedings.
Park then filed with the BIA both a motion to stay scheduled removal proceedings
before the IJ and a motion to reconsider the BIA’s April 21, 2004 decision. In a June 10,
2004 decision, the BIA determined that Park sought reconsideration because he believed the
BIA had not yet decided whether his crime was committed within five years of admission,
as required under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). As the BIA had
decided this issue in its April 21, 2004 Order, it denied Park’s motions.
On June 22, 2004, Park again moved before the BIA both to stay the proceedings
before the IJ and to reconsider its June 10, 2004 decision. On July 15, 2004, the BIA denied
the motion to stay proceedings, but granted the motion to reconsider. Noting that the question
of whether Park’s crime was committed within five years of admission was neither presented
to nor decided by the IJ in the first instance, the BIA modified its earlier finding of
removability. Without changing its finding that Park’s conviction was for a crime involving
moral turpitude, the BIA ordered that the parties be afforded the opportunity to litigate the
time period issue before the IJ.
Before the IJ, Park applied for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C.
5This section states: “Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time
after admission is deportable.” INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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§ 1229b(a). The DHS lodged a Notice of Additional Charge of Deportability, charging Park
with also being removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),5 for
having been convicted at any time after admission of an aggravated felony as defined in INA
§ 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) (“an offense relating to . . . counterfeiting, . . .
for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year”). Park denied removability under the
original and amended charges, and the parties presented argument on the issues of whether
the crime involving moral turpitude was committed by Park within five years of his
admission to the United States, and whether Park was removable for having been convicted
of an aggravated felony.
On August 23, 2004, the IJ ordered that Park be removed. After finding that Park was
not removable pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), because he
did not commit the crime involving moral turpitude within the time period prescribed by that
provision, the IJ found that Park was, however, removable pursuant to INA §
237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted at any time after
admission of an aggravated felony as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(R). She also noted that the government was “well within [its] right” to amend
the Notice to Appear and lodge additional charges during the pendency of proceedings. App.
10.
In determining that Park’s conviction was for “an offense relating to . . .
6counterfeiting,” the IJ began by observing that INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(R) “does not define counterfeiting by referring to any particular statute or
provision in any penal code or law.” App. 11. Consequently, the IJ reasoned that a wide
variety of activity, such as “counterfeiting in money, . . . counterfeiting in false seals or
trademarks or other copyright activity, can all fall within the definition of counterfeiting as
long as an offense relates to counterfeiting.” App. 11.
Next, the IJ invoked an instance where this Court considered the identical provision
at issue here–INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R)–and our conclusion that by
using the term “relating to,” “Congress evidenced an intent to define [the listed offense] in
its broadest sense.” App. 11 (quoting Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2001)).
The IJ continued to quote our analysis that “‘[u]nless the words ‘relating to’ have no effect,
the enumerated crime . . . must not be strictly confined to its narrowest meaning.’” App. 12
(quoting Drakes, 240 F.3d at 249).
Having concluded that INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), covers a
range of activities beyond the act of counterfeiting itself, the IJ proceeded to employ the
formal categorical approach–considering the statutory elements of the offense rather than the
particular facts underlying the conviction–in order to determine whether a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2320 is a conviction for “an offense relating to . . . counterfeiting.” The IJ explained
that in order to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2320, the government must prove
both that a defendant intentionally trafficked or attempted to traffic in goods or services, and
that the defendant knowingly used a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods
7or services. App. 13. She reasoned that although this statute is not directed at the act of
counterfeiting, by criminalizing the knowing use of a counterfeit mark in connection with
trafficking or attempting to traffic in goods or services, “‘the statute seeks to discourage
counterfeiting through the criminalization of the use of its end product.’” App. 15 (quoting
Albillo-Figueroa v. INS, 221 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000)). The IJ thus concluded that
the offense criminalized by 18 U.S.C. § 2320 was one which related to counterfeiting within
the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).
Because Park’s conviction was for an offense relating to counterfeiting; because the
conviction took place after Park’s admission as a permanent resident in 1998; and because
Park was sentenced to a term of confinement of more than one year, the IJ found Park
removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. App. 17; see also INA §
237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In addition, because the IJ found Park had
been convicted of an aggravated felony, she found him ineligible for cancellation of removal.
App. 18; see also INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Lastly, the IJ determined that there
was no evidence to indicate that Park was eligible for any other form of relief from removal
and ordered him removed to the Republic of Korea.
Park timely appealed to the BIA. On March 3, 2005, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s
decision without opinion, pursuant to its streamlining regulations, rendering the IJ’s decision
the final agency determination. App. 6; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).
II
6In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, the Supreme Court explained that:
[J]udicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the
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Although this Court lacks jurisdiction “to review any final order of removal against
an alien who is removable by reason of having committed [an aggravated felony],” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C), we have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction, that is, to determine
whether Park has been convicted of an aggravated felony and thus, whether 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(C) even applies. See Drakes, 240 F.3d at 247. In addition, per 8 U.S.C. §§
1252(a)(2)(D) and (a)(5), we have jurisdiction to review the question of law Park raises.
III
The government urges us to apply the principles of Chevron v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) to this case, instead of engaging in de novo review of the IJ’s
decision. However, as we have previously discussed, while “[w]e usually afford deference
to decisions of administrative agencies when we are reviewing the agency’s determination
of a statute the agency is charged with administering, . . . legal issues that turn on a pure
question of law not implicating the agency’s expertise do not raise the same concerns under
Chevron.” Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Drakes, 240 F.3d at
250-51. For example, while we are mindful of the fact that Chevron deference applies in
general to the Attorney General’s interpretation of the INA, see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999), as we observed in Patel, the concerns motivating that deference are
largely absent here. See Patel, 294 F.3d at 467-68 (citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425).6
immigration context where officials exercise especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations. A decision by the Attorney
General to deem certain offenses violent offenses committed in another country as
political in nature, and to allow the perpetrators to remain in the United States,
may affect our relations with that country or its neighbors. The judiciary is not
well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and
importance of such diplomatic repercussions.
526 U.S. at 425 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Moreover, as we noted in Drakes, the Attorney General has no particular expertise in
defining a term under federal law, yet it is “what federal courts do all the time.” Drakes, 240
F.3d at 251. For these reasons, here neither the Attorney General nor the BIA–let alone an
individual IJ–“is . . . entitled to Chevron deference as to whether a particular federal offense
is an aggravated felony.” Bobb v. Attorney General of the U.S., 458 F.3d 213, 217 n.4 (3d
Cir. 2006). We thus engage in de novo review.
IV
Per INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), an alien convicted of an
“aggravated felony” at any time after admission is deportable. Per INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), the term “aggravated felony” includes “an offense relating to . . .
counterfeiting . . . for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” Park was
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2320, which required both that he “intentionally
traffic[ked] or attempt[ed] to traffic in goods or services,” and that he “knowingly use[d] a
counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services.” 18 U.S.C. § 2320. Park
argues that a conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2320 is not “an offense relating to
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counterfeiting,” and thus is not an aggravated felony.
Park contends that in determining whether his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2320 is
for an “offense relating to counterfeiting,” the relevant comparison, using the categorical
approach, is between the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2320 and those of 18 U.S.C. § 471, which
criminalizes “falsely mak[ing], forg[ing], counterfeit[ing], or alter[ing] any obligation or
other security of the United States,” with intent to defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 471. Park’s argument
rests on the assumption that 18 U.S.C. § 471 represents the definition of counterfeiting under
federal law. However, Park offers no support for this assumption, and in fact, even a brief
look at Chapter 25 of Title 18 of the United States Code, where 18 U.S.C. § 471 is codified,
reveals that 18 U.S.C. § 471 is simply one of many federal statutes which criminalize several
different types of counterfeiting. For example, in addition to criminalizing the fabrication of
money or monetary instruments, other sections of this Chapter criminalize, inter alia, the
counterfeiting of seals of courts and signatures of judges or court officers (18 U.S.C. § 505);
the counterfeiting of seals of departments or agencies (18 U.S.C. § 506); and the
counterfeiting of ship’s papers (18 U.S.C. § 507). In addition, the term “counterfeit” is used
in other chapters of Title 18. For instance, Chapter 75 criminalizes the counterfeiting of a
passport (18 U.S.C. § 1543); Chapter 83 criminalizes the counterfeiting of keys suited to any
lock adopted by the Post Office (18 U.S.C. § 1704); and, of particular relevance here,
Chapter 113 criminalizes trafficking in counterfeit goods or services (18 U.S.C. § 2320).
Furthermore, Park ignores the fact that INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(R), does not define the “aggravated felony” as “counterfeiting,” but rather as “an
7The offense for which Park was convicted defined “counterfeit mark” as:
a spurious mark– that is used in connection with trafficking in
goods or services; that is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from, a mark registered for those goods or
services on the principal register in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew
such mark was so registered; and the use of which is likely to
cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive; or a spurious
designation that is identical with, or substantially
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offense relating to . . . counterfeiting.” Id. (emphasis added). This distinction is critical. The
Supreme Court has stated that “the ordinary meaning of [“relating to”] is a broad one.”
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (explaining that “relating to”
means “‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into
association with or connection with’”) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed.
1979)). Indeed, as we stated in Drakes, by using the phrase “an offense relating to,”
“Congress evidenced an intent to define [the listed offenses] in [their] broadest sense . . . .
Unless the words ‘relating to’ have no effect, the enumerated crime . . . must not be strictly
confined to its narrowest meaning.” Drakes, 240 F.3d at 249. See also Kamagate v. Ashcroft,
385 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that in the context of subsection (R), the term
“relating to” is used “to define aggravated felonies by reference to the general subject of the
offense of conviction, suggesting Congress’s intent to reach more broadly than any single
statute.”) (emphasis added).
Considering the broad reach of the term “relating to,” certainly a statute which
prohibits the knowing use of a counterfeit mark7 is a statute which codifies an offense
indistinguishable from, a designation as to which the remedies
of the Lanham Act are made available . . .
18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1) (2000).
8We reject Park’s argument that even if he is removable for having been convicted of an
aggravated felony, because his conviction was “nevertheless ‘not a particularly serious crime’ . .
., [he] is entitled to relief from removal.” (Pet’r Br. 17.) The only form of relief from removal for
which Park applied was cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
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relating to counterfeiting. Indeed, it is common for a federal criminal statute pertaining to
counterfeiting to include as an element of the crime either the act of counterfeiting or the
knowing use of the end product of an act of counterfeiting. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 505
(requiring as an element either the counterfeiting of a seal of a United States court or the
knowing use of such a counterfeit seal, knowing it to be counterfeit); 18 U.S.C. § 506
(requiring as an element either the counterfeiting of a seal of a United States agency or the
knowing use of such a counterfeit seal); 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (requiring as an element either the
counterfeiting of a passport or the willful and knowing use of a counterfeit passport).
It is clear, then, that by penalizing  those who traffic in goods while knowingly using
a counterfeit mark, 18 U.S.C. § 2320 is simply one of several federal criminal statutes which
“seeks to discourage [the act of] counterfeiting through the criminalization of the use of its
end product.” Albillo-Figueroa, 221 F.3d at 1073 (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 472, which
criminalizes the knowing use or possession of counterfeit bills with the intent to defraud, is
an “offense relating to counterfeiting”). As such, the statute defines an offense relating to
counterfeiting, and Park’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2320 was properly counted
as an “aggravated felony,” per  INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).8
Aliens convicted of an aggravated felony are ineligible for this relief, regardless of whether their
crime was particularly serious. See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (barring an alien
convicted of an “aggravated felony” from eligibility for cancellation of removal).
13
V
Park also argues that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars the DHS from lodging an
additional removal charge based on the same facts alleged in the Notice to Appear. Judicial
estoppel is “a judge-made doctrine that seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position
inconsistent with one that she has previously asserted in the same or in a previous
proceeding. It is not intended to eliminate all inconsistencies . . . ; rather it is intended to
prevent litigants from playing fast and loose with the courts.” In re Chambers Dev. Co., Inc.,
148 F.3d 214, 229 (3d Cir. 1998). As such, “[a]sserting inconsistent positions does not trigger
the application of judicial estoppel unless intentional self-contradiction is used as a means
of obtaining unfair advantage.” Id.
The IJ did not err by allowing the DHS to amend the Notice to Appear by lodging an
additional charge. First of all, the BIA has held that “unless [it] qualifies or limits a remand
for a specific purpose, the remand is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration
of any and all matters which the [IJ] deems appropriate . . . or which are brought to his
attention in compliance with the appropriate regulations.” Matter of Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec.
600, 601 (BIA 1978). The regulations do permit the lodging of additional charges in removal
proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e) (“At any time during the proceeding, additional or
substituted charges of inadmissibility and/or deportability may be lodged by the Service in
14
writing.”). This practice has also been approved by the courts. See De Faria v. INS, 13 F.3d
422, 424 (1st Cir. 1993) (where hearing was reopened, there was no impropriety in DHS
lodging substitute charges which could have been lodged at the outset).
Moreover, it would have been inappropriate to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel
here because the DHS did not advance two inconsistent positions. Instead, the DHS simply
lodged an alternative, yet compatible, removal charge. To be sure, it is not uncommon for the
DHS to conceive of a single crime as qualifying both as a crime involving moral turpitude
and as an aggravated felony. See e.g., Bobb, 458 F.3d at 215 (based on a plea of guilty to one
crime, petitioner was charged with being removable for having committed an aggravated
felony and later was additionally charged with being removable for having committed a
qualifying crime involving moral turpitude). Furthermore, as the First Circuit has reasoned,
“there is no requirement that the [DHS] advance every conceivable basis for [removability]
in the [Notice to Appear]. . . . [S]uch a rule would needlessly complicate proceedings in the
vast majority of cases.” De Faria, 13 F.3d at 424.
CONCLUSION
Because we determine that Park was convicted of an aggravated felony and that the
question of law he raised is without merit, we will dismiss the petition.
